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“CONFRONTING” FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE: CRAWFORD
ROADBLOCKS TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM
TRIALS
John Scott *
I. INTRODUCTION
In the first decade of this century, a central preoccupation of American
foreign policy has been the rise of international terrorism. 1 This
phenomenon provokes questions about the interrelation of international and
domestic criminal law, constitutional interpretation, intelligence gathering,
and military strategy. Now, after the challenges of the last eight years, the
rhetoric (if not yet the reality) of American policy on terrorism seems to be
changing. 2 The attempt to transfer prosecution from military tribunals to
Article III courts is exemplary of this overall shift. But there are deeper
legal issues at play beyond the political repercussions of this shift. 3 A
recent line of cases from the Supreme Court has the potential to make the
process of trying suspected terrorists more complicated than it need be.4
Crawford v. Washington and its progeny have articulated a new standard
for Confrontation Clause analysis and in so doing have raised significant
questions about the future admissibility of certain evidence in criminal
trials. 5
*

Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Wesleyan
University, 2006.
1
See David M. Edelstein & Ronald R. Krebs, Think Again: Barack Obama and the War
on Terror, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/01/18/
think_again_barack_obama_and_the_war_on_terror.
2
Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1. But see Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, U.S.
Drops Plan for a 9/11 Trial in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A1.
3
Scott Shane, Site for Terror Trial Isn’t Its Only Obstacle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at
A18.
4
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5
Joshua L. Dratel, The Impact of Crawford v. Washington on Terrorism Prosecutions,
CHAMPION, Sept. 2004, at 19; Savage, supra note 2.
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The goal of this Comment 6 is to analyze the new confrontation rule
from Crawford to determine what types of challenges its more rigorous
testimonial evidence standard poses for prosecutors in future terrorism
cases. Subpart II.A will provide background on the relevant cases,
discussing the Court’s holding in Crawford as well as its subsequent
clarification in Davis v. Washington. Subpart II.B will describe the two
primary federal regulations governing specific rules applicable to the use of
foreign intelligence at trial. Part III will argue that the new Confrontation
Clause standard potentially conflicts with these federal regulations and
analyze the costs this conflict could impose on the government. Lastly, Part
IV will attempt to weigh the merits of potential solutions and assess the
likelihood of their adoption.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CRAWFORD: CHANGING THE RULES

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . . .” 7 The common law developed a
general antipathy towards the introduction of hearsay evidence and it is
thought the Confrontation Clause embodies the same general principle.8
The common law also disfavors reliance upon ex parte testimony presented
through affidavits. 9 Defendants have the right to compel witnesses against
6
The goal of this Comment is not to promote the introduction of unreliable hearsay
evidence against foreign defendants at trial. Rather, both the new Crawford rule and the new
FISA warrant standard are problematic and should be reassessed because they impose
significant costs on prosecution and these costs may discourage the Government from
bringing charges in criminal courts against suspected terrorists. The assumption is that
prosecutions of foreign terrorists are going to continue in one forum or another (be it
military, criminal, or “other”). This Comment starts from the presumption that Article III
courts are preferable, and for this reason the legal community should be cognizant of
instances where (perhaps unintended) intersections of rules potentially throw up road blocks
to the introduction of otherwise reliable evidence.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8
See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S 74, 86 (1970) (stating that the Confrontation Clause and
hearsay rules stem from the same roots but are not the same thing); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 155 (1970); see also Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 475, 501 (2006).
9
The holdings in both Crawford and Davis rely heavily upon examples of sixteenth- and
seventeenth century prosecutions by ex parte affidavit as justification for the “testimonial
hearsay” rule. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–46, 50–51. In
particular, they focus on the case of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason on the
basis of untested, ex parte affidavits. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
This is the proper context within which to examine the Framers’ intentions with regards to
confrontation. Daniel B. Shanes, Confronting Testimonial Hearsay: Understanding the New
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them to appear and then to cross-examine those witnesses to test for
weaknesses in their testimony. 10
On its face, the Confrontation Clause seems to require a blanket
prohibition of any statement made by a declarant not testifying at trial. 11
Such a shallow reading, however, would abrogate centuries of common law
precedent recognizing a variety of valid hearsay exceptions.12 Treating the
words in the Confrontation Clause as a literal command would be far too
extreme and out of line with the intentions of the Framers. 13 Therefore, the
challenge for the courts is to balance the constitutionally enshrined
preference for face-to-face testimony in criminal trials and the right to
cross-examine hostile witnesses with the workaday realities of a functioning
criminal justice system. 14
In 1980, the Supreme Court set out a test for evidence challenged
under the Confrontation Clause that attempted to strike just such a
balance. 15 The Court determined in Ohio v. Roberts that the Sixth
Amendment guaranteed a substantive right to challenge the reliability of
evidence at trial.16 The defendant in this case was charged with forgery. 17
At a preliminary hearing, the defense attorney called the daughter of the
victim and attempted in vain to get her to admit to authorizing the
defendant’s use of the checks and credit cards in question.18 At trial, the
defendant took the stand and testified that the daughter had in fact
authorized him to use those checks and cards.19 Between the deposition and
the trial, the daughter had run away from home and her whereabouts were
unknown. 20 Consequently, the prosecutor sought to introduce her testimony
from the preliminary hearing to rebut the respondent’s statements. 21 This

Confrontation Clause, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 879, 880–81 (2009); see Crawford, 541 U.S. at
54; cf. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1994).
10
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 243 (1895).
12
See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80 (“It is not argued, nor could it be, that the constitutional
right to confrontation requires that no hearsay evidence can ever be introduced.”).
13
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
14
Id. at 66.
15
Id. at 56.
16
Brian McEvoy, Note, Classified Evidence and the Confrontation Clause: Correcting a
Misapplication of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 395, 399
n.26 (2005); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
17
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 59.
20
Id. at 59–60.
21
Id. at 59.
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evidence was admitted, the transcript was read to the jury, and the
defendant was convicted. 22 The conviction, however, was overturned on
appeal. 23
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. 24 The Court held that the testimony at
the preliminary hearing was admissible under the Confrontation Clause
because it bore “sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ and afforded the ‘trier-offact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’” 25
In prior cases the Court had recognized that certain hearsay exceptions “rest
upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within
them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’” 26
These holdings supported the principle that even if certain evidence is not
tested through cross-examination at trial, it is nevertheless constitutionally
“safe” because it has either been tested prior to trial, or the surrounding
circumstances indicate that the trier-of-fact can trust the evidence. 27 These
exceptions are “firmly rooted” as they have been examined and tested by
the courts over time, and ensure as “strict an adherence to the truth as would
the obligation of an oath.” 28

22

Id.
Id. at 60; see also State v. Roberts, 378 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ohio 1978) (holding that the
testimony at issue did not fall within a recognized hearsay exception and thus violated the
defendant’s confrontation right). The Ohio Supreme Court held that here the hearsay
exception for prior testimony of an unavailable witness was not properly invoked because
the purpose of the prior hearing was not sufficiently related to the subsequent trial. Id.
24
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56.
25
Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972)).
26
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)). In
footnote 8 of the opinion, the Court specifically identifies certain types of hearsay exceptions
that have been so classified. Id. at 66 n.8. See Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 215–16 (cross
examined prior-trial testimony); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (same); Mattox,
156 U.S. at 244 (dying declaration). Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Roberts, also
states “the business and public records exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the
hearsay exceptions.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8 (quoting J. Broocks Greer, III, Comment,
Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651, 668
(1970)).
27
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 (holding that statements of an unavailable witness were
admissible because the testimony had been tested by cross examination at a prior hearing);
see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88–89 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
28
Or cross-examination at trial. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999) (quoting
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
23
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1. The Crawford Revolution
Until 2004, the holding in Roberts was recognized as the proper
approach to the problem of reconciling hearsay exceptions with the
Confrontation Clause. 29 Courts evaluated the “reliability” of disputed
evidence and gave significant weight to exceptions cataloged in the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 30 In 2004, however, the Court announced a radical
departure from this established process. 31 It abandoned the case-by-case
analysis of Roberts, for (at least on the surface) a more dogmatic analysis of
the “testimonial/non-testimonial” character of the evidence.32 According to
the majority in Crawford v. Washington, the Roberts Court had its Sixth
Amendment analysis wrong: the Confrontation Clause is a procedural
guarantee, not a substantive one. 33 And as a procedural right, it does not
bow to competing policy interests or notions of judicial efficiency.
In August 1999, Michael Crawford was arrested for murder. 34
Crawford was accused of stabbing Kenneth Lee in Lee’s apartment after
Lee allegedly attempted to rape Crawford’s wife.35 Crawford claimed at
trial that he had gone to the victim’s apartment to confront him about this,
and while he was there a fight broke out.36 Crawford claimed that during
this fight he stabbed Lee in self-defense. 37
This version of events conflicted with a statement made by Crawford’s
wife to the police on the night of the incident. 38 Crawford’s wife did not
testify at trial, but the prosecution introduced the tape recording under the
29

See id. at 124–25; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990); Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392 (1986).
30
See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124–25; Wright, 497 U.S. at 814; Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182;
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392.
31
Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 731
(2008) (“In 2004, after nearly twenty-four years of this well-entrenched reliability approach,
the Supreme Court substantially altered the course of the Confrontation Clause analysis with
its pathbreaking decision in Crawford v. Washington.”) (emphasis added); Richard D.
Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553, 554 (2007) (“Crawford
v. Washington changed the landscape dramatically.”); Jennifer B. Sokoler, Between
Substance and Procedure: A Role for States’ Interests in the Scope of the Confrontation
Clause, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 170 (2010) (“In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme
Court upended close to a quarter century’s worth of jurisprudence . . . .”); see also Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
32
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see McEvoy, supra note 16, at 398.
33
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
34
Id. at 38.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 39.
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statement-against-interest hearsay exception. 39 After being convicted,
Crawford challenged the admission of the tape. The Washington Supreme
Court upheld his conviction, concluding that: “although [Crawford’s wife’s]
statement did not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it bore
guarantees of trustworthiness.” 40
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Washington
Supreme Court. While the Roberts Court held that the Confrontation
Clause provides a substantive right to reliable evidence, Justice Scalia
stated that the Clause is primarily concerned with ensuring direct, face-toface confrontation at trial.41
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia took a long view of history
and drew on sources dating as far back as the Roman Empire. 42 In
particular, he focused his attention on one specific incident: the trial, and
subsequent execution, of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 for treason. 43 In that
trial, the Crown relied primarily on the accusations of Lord Cobham,
Raleigh’s supposed co-conspirator. 44 Cobham made a statement accusing
Raleigh of treason to the Privy Council prior to trial as well as in a separate
letter. 45 While Cobham did not testify at trial, both of these records were
read to the jury. 46 Raleigh argued that these statements were coerced, but
his entreaties to bring Cobham before the jury for cross-examination were
ignored. 47
The fallout of the Raleigh “show trial” influenced both British and
American jurisprudence by solidifying the importance of confrontation and
cross-examination. 48 The Crawford opinion highlights how attempts by the
Government to introduce untested ex parte evidence were met with
resistance in both England and the Colonies.49 Moreover, the primacy of

39

See WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2003). She admitted in the statement that she led
Crawford to Lee’s apartment and thus facilitated the assault. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
Crawford’s wife did not testify at trial because her testimony was subject to the spousal
privilege under the Washington Rules of Evidence. See WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1)
(1994).
40
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41 (citing State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002)).
41
Id. at 57.
42
Id. at 43.
43
Id. at 44.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 50.
49
See, e.g., King v. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696) (holding that in a misdemeanor
libel case, the statement of a dead witness could not be introduced because the defendant did
not have a chance to cross examine); Lord Fenwick’s Case, (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537,
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face-to-face confrontation was recognized even after the drafting of the
Constitution. 50 Justice Scalia cited opinions from the early years of the
American republic in which the requirement of face-to-face confrontation
and cross-examination continued to be “uncompromising.” 51
The Crawford Court specifically rejected the Roberts reliability test.
In its place, the Court stated that any testimonial evidence not testified to at
trial will be excluded, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant
had previously cross-examined the testimony. 52 According to Justice
Scalia, under the Roberts regime, courts had lost sight of this important
principle of trial procedure. 53 The central holding of Crawford is that
admission into evidence of a tape-recorded witness statement to police
officers violates the Constitution’s uncompromising mandate. 54 According
to Justice Scalia, the Confrontation Clause excludes all testimonial hearsay
evidence. 55 In this new regime, there is no room for an inquiry into
reliability. The Court went so far as to ridicule such a standard, remarking
that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously
reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is
obviously guilty.” 56
What Crawford lacks, however, is a specific definition of what
“testimonial evidence” really means. The Court defended its incomplete
description by arguing that the opinion need only focus on the core or
“nucleus” of the Clause. 57 As the statements at issue in Crawford fit well
within this core, the Court needed to opine no further. 58 Yet even the extent
of this core is not clearly defined. At times the Court’s logic implies that
the subjective intent of the declarant is primary in determining the scope of

591–92 (H.C.) (“[N]o deposition of a person can be read, though beyond sea, unless in cases
where the party is to be read against was privy to the examination, and might have cross
examined him . . . .”). In the early eighteenth century, the Virginia Council protested
untested ex parte evidence after governors privately issued several commissions to examine
witnesses against particular men ex parte. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47.
50
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49.
51
Id. (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794) and State v. Campbell, 30
S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124 (S.C. Ct. App. 1844)).
52
Id. at 53–54.
53
Id. at 60 (“Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales.”).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 61 (“[The Court imposes] an absolute bar to statements that are testimonial,
absent a prior opportunity to cross-examine . . . .”).
56
Id. at 62.
57
Id. at 51–52.
58
Id.
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“testimony.” 59 Bearing testimony against a person requires that the
“bearer” intend to expose the person to some liability. 60 At other times the
Court articulated that the test is whether the “objective” witness would
reasonably understand that the testimony would later be available at trial. 61
Given the ambiguity of the holding, it took only two years for the Court to
again take up this issue and attempt to clarify the expanse of “testimony.”
2. Davis and Hammon: The Purpose of the Inquiry.
In 2006, the Court took the opportunity to further elaborate on its
initial definition of testimony announced in Crawford. The Court in Davis
v. Washington contrasted the factual settings of two cases to articulate a
more exact definition of “testimonial” evidence.62 Both fact patterns deal
with police response to reports of domestic violence. In the first situation
the primary purpose of the inquiry eliciting the testimony was to properly
respond to an “ongoing emergency.” 63 In the second, the primary purpose
was to collect evidence for trial.64
The facts in Davis are as follows: a victim of domestic violence placed
a call to a 911 operator.65 She told the operator that her boyfriend was in
the process of assaulting her. 66 In the course of the conversation, the
operator determined that the boyfriend’s name was Adrian Davis. 67 Later
in the call, the victim reported that Davis had run out of the house. 68 The
operator remained on the phone and collected more information on the
boyfriend and the basis of the domestic dispute. 69
Davis was charged with assault, but his ex-girlfriend did not appear to
testify at trial.70 The prosecution attempted to introduce the transcript of the

59
Id. at 51 (“Testimony, in turn, is typically [a] solemn declaration or affirmation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”) (internal quotations omitted).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 52 (“[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial.”) (internal quotations omitted).
62
547 U.S. 813 (2006). The two cases which were consolidated for this matter were:
State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) and Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.
2005).
63
Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–18, 828.
64
Id. at 819–20.
65
Id. at 817.
66
Id. at 817–18.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 818.
70
Id. at 819.
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911 conversation, however. 71 The trial court admitted the transcript,
determining that the statements were non-testimonial. 72
The facts of the second case, Hammon v. Indiana, closely mirror those
of Davis: the police responded to reports of domestic abuse at the home of
Amy and Hershel Hammon. 73 When the police arrived at the house, Mrs.
Hammon appeared frightened and there was evidence of a struggle. 74
Initially, however, she stated that “nothing was the matter.” 75 Mr. Hammon
likewise denied assaulting her. Eventually, after separating Mr. Hammon
from Mrs. Hammon, she admitted to one officer that her husband had
thrown her to the ground and hit her.76 She then filled out a battery
affidavit. 77
The state charged Mr. Hammon with domestic battery. Mrs. Hammon
was subpoenaed, but did not appear.78 The prosecutor called the officer
who took the statement to testify to its substance. The trial court
determined that, under hearsay exceptions for present sense impression and
excited utterance, the evidence was admissible.79
The Supreme Court determined that these two statements were
distinguishable under the Confrontation Clause and held that:
Statements are non-testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
80
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

The Court gave three reasons why statements made during the 911 call
in Davis are different from statements made to the police in Hammon or
Crawford. 81 First, while the Davis statements were made as the events
were taking place, the Hammon and Crawford statements were made after
the events in question. 82 Second, the purpose of the 911 operator’s
questions was to resolve the ongoing emergency, while the purpose of the

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 819–20.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
Id. at 827.
Id.
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police officers’ interrogation in both Hammon and Crawford was to
investigate a past crime. 83 Finally, the respective formalities of the
statements were different. The declarant in Crawford made her statement in
a police station, responding calmly to direct police questions; the declarant
in Davis was “frantic” and speaking from the scene of the alleged crime. 84
The Supreme Court concluded that the portions of the 911 transcript
occurring prior to Davis fleeing the house were non-testimonial and
admissible. 85 The affidavit and statements at issue in Hammon were
testimonial and therefore inadmissible.86
Much more recently, the Court has provided additional clarification of
the “primary purpose” inquiry articulated in Davis. 87 In Michigan v.
Bryant, the Court addressed the admissibility of a dying declaration by a
shooting victim identifying the perpetrator. 88 The Court held that a
shooting suspect at large constituted an ongoing emergency and that
statements elicited in an attempt to respond to that emergency were
admissible under Crawford. 89
B. TOOLS FOR TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS

Several years before the Court began to reevaluate the Confrontation
Clause, Congress reevaluated and rearticulated the standards for gathering
foreign intelligence. As we will see below, these changes implicate one
another.
1. “Primary Purpose” in FISA
In October 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). 90 Under FISA, the government is permitted to
conduct surveillance and searches in pursuit of foreign intelligence material
without showing the normal probable cause to believe a crime had been

83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. at 828–29.
86
Id. at 828–30. While the Court held that the 911 conversation was non-testimonial, it
noted that this only applies to the part of the conversation that took place while the declarant
was being attacked. The later part, after Davis left the house, was not addressed, but it was
hinted that it could be considered testimonial. Id. at 828–29.
87
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011).
88
Id. In analyzing the objective circumstances of the statements, the Court applied the
underlying logic of the traditional hearsay rules. Id. at 1155.
89
The Court’s analysis focused on the objective circumstances of the questioning,
including the formality of the interaction and the actions of the officers. Id. at 1160-61; see
also id. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90
Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–85 (2006)).
84
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committed. 91 FISA was designed to fill the legal gaps left by Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 92 Both the Court and
Congress had recognized the Executive Branch’s need to collect certain
information in order to satisfy its constitutional duties. 93 Additionally, in
certain contexts this power could be exercised without invoking the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. 94 Nevertheless, during the
1960s and 1970s, past abuses of executive power, specifically with regards
to wiretapping and information gathering, prompted a reevaluation of
permissible government surveillance activities.95 FISA therefore set out the
standards for collecting foreign intelligence both with and without a
warrant. 96
FISA covers both electronic surveillance and physical searches. 97
Foreign intelligence information is that information which is:
(1) Information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary
to, the ability of the United States to protect against (A) actual or potential attack or

91

RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 77 (2008), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf.
92
See Cedric Logan, The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 209, 219 (2009); Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
269, 274 (2008). FISA warrant procedures provide an alternative to Title III when federal
agents are conducting electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence. Logan, supra.
Unlike Title III, which requires that agents identify the crime that has been or will be
committed as well as the specific target of the surveillance, FISA requires that the target of
surveillance be a foreign power and that the substance of the surveillance relate to the United
State’s ability to protect against foreign aggression. Id. at 219–20.
93
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (1968);
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972).
94
Keith, 407 U.S. at 303.
95
The “Church Committee” (named after Chairman Sen. Frank Church) was established
to “conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to
intelligence activates and the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities
were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.” CHURCH COMM. REPORTS,
BOOK II INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at v
(1976) (citing S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. § 1 (1975)). The report highlighted decades of abusive
targeting of different social groups by law enforcement acting under the auspices of
“intelligence gathering.” See id. at 8–10. The Church Committee and the Watergate scandal
indicated that without regulation and oversight, this power had significant potential to be
abused. See id. at 10.
96
50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2006) (authorizing electronic surveillance without a court order);
§ 1804 (defining the application process for court orders).
97
Id. § 1802 (authorizing electronic surveillance); § 1822 (authorizing physical
searches). Physical searches were not covered until 1994. See Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 807, 108 Stat. 3423 (1994) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 50 U.S.C.).
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other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (B)
sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or (C) clandestine
intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by
an agent of a foreign power; or (2) information with respect to a foreign power or
foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary
to (A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (B) the conduct of
98
the foreign affairs of the United States.

In order to conduct surveillance the Attorney General may 99 apply to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for a warrant. 100 The
court will grant an application if it finds there is probable cause to believe
that the target is an agent of a foreign power and that a foreign power (or
agent of a foreign power) controls the location at which the surveillance is
to be conducted. 101 The requirements for granting a FISA warrant are
similar to but less rigorous than the standards under Title III. 102 Whereas
under Title III an applicant must show probable cause to believe that the
surveillance will turn up evidence of a crime, under FISA the Government
must only demonstrate probable cause that the subject of the surveillance is
a foreign power or agent. 103
In addition to information about the subject of the surveillance, the
Government is required to show how they will comply with minimization
procedures in order to prevent the gathering, retention, or dissemination of

98

50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).
The Attorney General is also authorized under FISA to conduct warrantless
surveillance so long as it is directed at foreign powers. Section 102 of the Act provides that
“[t]he President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance
without a court order under this [subchapter] to acquire foreign intelligence information for
periods of up to one year . . . .” Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-511, § 102, 92 Stat. 1783, 1786 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006)). The
Attorney General must certify, however, (1) that the surveillance is solely directed at
communication exclusively between or among foreign powers, and (2) that there is no
“substantial likelihood” that the surveillance will intercept communications of United States
citizens. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A–B).
100
An application must contain the following: (1) the identity of the target, (2) location
where the surveillance is to be directed, (3) the type of communications sought to be
acquired, and (4) the means by which the surveillance shall be conducted. 50 U.S.C. § 1804.
101
Id.
102
Blum, supra note 92, at 276.
103
Id. Under the warrant provision of FISA, an agent of a foreign power can include a
United States citizen, provided that the basis for determining the probable cause that the
citizen is an agent of a foreign power is not based solely on activities protected by the First
Amendment. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A).
99
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nonpublic information. 104 Determination of these minimization standards is
left to the discretion of the Attorney General.105
As originally articulated in the statute, the “purpose” of a FISA
investigation had to be the collection of foreign intelligence. 106 If evidence
of criminal wrongdoing was discovered, however, this could still be
introduced at trial so long as the requirements of the FISA statute relating to
the identity of the target and the minimization procedures were met.107
Therefore, the scope of “purpose” was and still is significant. The
exact meaning of the term, however, evolved from the 1980s through the
early 2000s. 108 Prior to the passage of FISA, the Fourth Circuit had
analyzed the issue of the use of foreign intelligence information in court and
articulated a standard.109 That court held in United States v. Troung Dinh
Hung that the exclusionary rule does not apply where the primary purpose
of an investigation is foreign intelligence gathering, and so information
collected is admissible at a subsequent trial.110 The court dismissed the
plaintiff’s argument that a sole purpose test should be adopted, as “almost
all foreign intelligence investigations are in part criminal investigations.” 111
Adopting a sole purpose test would require the government to seek judicial
warrants whenever it undertook foreign intelligence surveillance.112 This

104

Procedures must minimize use of “nonpublicly available information concerning
unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain,
produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information . . . .” 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1),
1806(a). The minimization procedures also must articulate how information can be shared
between federal agents and agencies. Id. § 1806.
105
Id. §§ 1801(h), 1802(a)(1)(C). Until 1995, the minimization standards were the
“standard minimization procedures” generally utilized by the government when conducting
electronic surveillance. In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619 (FISA Ct. 2002). Pursuant to these standards, after the
information has been collected and processed into an intelligible form, a reviewing official
makes a determination as to whether the information is, or “might be,” foreign intelligence.
Information would only be “minimized” or discarded if it “could not be” foreign
intelligence. Id. at 618. If it satisfied this very general standard it was logged and stored so
as to allow later recovery and further analysis. Id.
106
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B).
107
See generally id. § 1806(a–e).
108
Diane Carraway Piette & Jesselyn Radack, Piercing the “Historical Mists”: The
People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of the “Wall,” 17 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 437, 452–53 (2006).
109
United States v. Troung Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
110
Id. at 915; see also Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009) (explaining
the exclusionary rule).
111
Truong, 629 F.2d at 915.
112
Id. at 916.
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fails to acknowledge the government’s legitimate interest in conducting this
type of surveillance. 113
After FISA, other federal courts applied the holding in Truong to the
new statute, and determined that the primary purpose of the investigation
needed to be intelligence gathering. 114 In denying a defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence collected through a FISA warrant, the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York cited Truong and stated “surveillance
under FISA is appropriate only if foreign intelligence surveillance is the
Government’s primary purpose.” 115 In addition to the Second and Fourth
Circuits, other courts from around the country weighed in on this issue and
determined that, pursuant to Truong, “purpose” as articulated in FISA
should be interpreted to mean “primary purpose.” 116
While not addressed by the Supreme Court, this standard was adopted
by the Justice Department (DOJ). 117 Under its FISA mandate to
“minimize” misuse of information, DOJ regulated contact between its
Criminal Division and the FBI to ensure that the “primary purpose” of its
FISA warrants was not compromised. 118 The official line, articulated in the
1995 Protocols, was that when facts collected under FISA “reasonably
indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or will be
committed,” the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), in
conjunction with the FBI, can notify the Criminal Division.119 Otherwise
operations are kept separate. In practice, these protocols built a “wall”
between the various departments as the specific requirements attached to

113

Id.
United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that primary
purpose applies to FISA); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (same);
see also United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging the
test but not deciding on its applicability).
115
United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1189–90 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
116
Johnson, 952 F.2d, at 572 (First Circuit holding that primary purpose applies to
FISA); see also Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 964 (Ninth Circuit acknowledging the primary
purpose test).
117
Richard Scruggs, head of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) in
1993, believed that the primary purpose standard was controlling on FISA. Piette & Radack,
supra note 108, at 471–72. This position was first articulated in a memo by Assistant
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General,
to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., et al. (1995), available at
http://old.nationalreview.com/document/document_1995_gorelick_memo.pdf
[hereinafter
Gorelick Memo]. In July 1995, the procedures suggested by Scruggs and Gorelick came into
effect. Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States (July 19,
1995), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html [hereinafter 1995
Protocols].
118
1995 Protocols, supra note 117, at (A)1–2.
119
Id. at A(1).
114
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information transfer became so complex that sharing during the late 1990s
simply was not done. 120
The guidelines adopted in 1995 assured that “FISA information could
almost never be shared with criminal investigators.” 121 Adopting the
primary purpose standard encouraged thinking critically about the
involvement of criminal investigators in FISA investigations, but erecting a
wall was, in hindsight, an overreaction. The consequence of this
overreaction became clear in September 2001.
Following the September 11 attacks, the government tried to determine
what failures or oversights prevented the plot from being uncovered and the
Soon it became clear that restrictions on
perpetrators stopped. 122
information sharing imposed within the DOJ had seriously hindered the
ability of the government to track and respond to the threat.123 In October
2001, Congress passed the United and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 (PATRIOT Act). 124 This collection of legislation covered a wide
array of areas: it increased the emergency surveillance period from twentyfour to seventy-two hours, expanded the use of electronic and physical
searches, and extended surveillance periods from 90 to 120 days. 125
Arguably the most significant change brought about by the PATRIOT
Act, however, was the addition of a single word to 50 U.S.C. § 1804. This
statute governed applications for warrants from the FISC. 126 The
PATRIOT Act added the word “significant” immediately before the word
“purpose.” 127 In doing so, Congress effectively knocked out the foundation
of the wall that had been built within the DOJ. 128 The courts could now

120
Blum, supra note 92, at 281. This does not mean it was impossible. Some contact
continued: information gathered under a FISA warrant could pass between the FBI and the
Criminal Division if it was determined to relate to a “significant federal crime.” 1995
Protocols, supra note 117, at A(1). The Criminal Division could also provide “advice” in
intelligence operations to better preserve the option of later criminal prosecution. Id. at
A(6).
121
Blum, supra note 92, at 281 (quoting JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 81 (2006)).
122
See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT (2004).
123
Id.
124
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
125
Blum, supra note 92, at 280.
126
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2006); Blum, supra note 92, at 281–82; see also William
C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1267 (2007).
127
§ 218, 115 Stat. at 291.
128
Id.
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issue FISA warrants in investigations where the primary purpose was not
foreign intelligence gathering. 129 Requiring only that intelligence gathering
be a “significant purpose” implies that agents can use FISA’s secret and
more permissive procedures when their primary purpose was to gather
evidence for criminal prosecution.130
By early 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft had revoked Reno’s
1995 procedures and instituted a new set of minimization procedures. 131
According to Ashcroft, “[t]he USA Patriot Act allows FISA to be used for
‘a significant purpose,’ rather than the primary purpose, of obtaining
foreign intelligence information.” 132 Thus, it allows FISA to be used
primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a significant foreign
intelligence purpose remains. 133 These 2002 Protocols stated that “[t]he
Criminal Division and OIPR shall have access to all information developed
in full field [Foreign Intelligence (FI)] and [Foreign Counterintelligence
(FCI)] investigations.” 134 In general “[t]he FBI, the Criminal Division, and
OIPR shall consult with one another concerning full field FI and FCI
investigations” and “[t]he FBI, the Criminal Division, and OIPR shall meet
regularly to conduct consultations.” 135 Criminal prosecution and foreign
intelligence gathering were melded under the amended FISA, which
allowed prosecutors to take advantage of the more deferential warrant
standards when conducting investigations. 136
The FISA Review Court upheld Ashcroft’s protocols and the
significant purpose standard later that year. 137 That court held that the
significant purpose test satisfies the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. 138 In its decision, the court specifically stated that under this
new standard, the primary purpose of the relevant investigation could be
criminal prosecution.139

129

Id.
Id.
131
Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States (Mar. 6,
2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html [hereinafter 2002
Protocols].
132
Id.
133
Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000)).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Blum, supra note 92, at 282–83.
137
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
138
Id. at 737.
139
Id. at 735 (holding the intelligence interest must only be “measurable”).
130

2011]

“CONFRONTING” FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

1055

While other federal courts are split, 140 if the significant purpose test is
ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court, 141 there will be profound
consequences for criminal prosecutions utilizing FISA evidence. Most
pressing for terrorism prosecution is that while the significant purpose test
makes it easier for the government to collect information, it may
simultaneously make it more difficult to later introduce this evidence at
trial.
2. CIPA and “Classified” Evidence
In addition to providing alternative means for gathering foreign
intelligence information, the federal government has created alternative
means for introducing that evidence at trial.142 The challenge is that the
same government interests that motivate a separate standard for gathering
information under FISA also compel the government to keep collected
information secret. The struggle over how and when to allow defendants
access to classified information is not a new problem, and Congress has
already provided the government an alternative to producing classified
evidence at trial. 143
Historically, prosecutors were often put in a difficult position when a
court determined that classified information needed to be disclosed.
Generally, they had only two options: either disclose the information or
dismiss the case. 144 This lead to a practice called “graymail” where

140

United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 92, 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (acknowledging the
significant purpose test accepted by the FISA Review Court, but declining to consider the
constitutionality in the immediate case); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 333 n.6
(4th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging the new standard but applying the pre-PATRIOT Act
standard); United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 996–97 (D. Minn. 2008)
(expressing concern with the constitutionality of the significant purpose test); Mayfield v.
United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1041 (D. Or. 2007) (declining to adopt FISA Review
Court’s logic). But cf. United States v. Ning Wen, 477 F.3d 896, 897 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding that “significant purpose” does not offend the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 308 n.9 (D. Conn. 2008) (adopting the significant purpose
test); In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct.
Rev. 2008) (reiterating the court’s previous holding in favor of significant purpose).
141
Upholding the significant purpose test would be consistent with the Court’s recent
decisions adopting ever-larger exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. See Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not
apply to police recordkeeping mistakes); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)
(“[Exclusion] has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”); Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 11–12 (1995) (articulating the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule).
142
See infra note 152.
143
See 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 6 (2006).
144
McEvoy, supra note 16, at 405.

1056

JOHN SCOTT

[Vol. 101

defendants would request classified information, on the hope that the court
would grant their request and the prosecution would decide to drop the
case. 145
In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA). 146 In essence, CIPA increased the relevance threshold that
defendants must meet in order to introduce classified information. 147
Unlike regular evidence, which must simply be relevant, CIPA requires
classified information to be highly relevant or material.148
Either party may initiate CIPA proceedings before trial.149 If the
defense wants to introduce classified information, the prosecutor may
challenge this by filing a motion with the judge. 150 The motion itself
remains confidential, and the judge must decide if the information is
discoverable. 151 If she does, however, the prosecution must produce either
the evidence requested or an adequate substitute. 152 Pursuant to CIPA,
prosecutors may provide defendants affidavits summarizing classified
information in lieu of those defendants subpoenaing actual testimony. 153
The adequacy of substitute information is dependent upon the facts of the
case. 154
The Fourth Circuit debated the precise nature of an adequate substitute
in United States v. Moussaoui. 155 Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested in 2001
for immigration violations, but six additional charges were later added

145

Id.
Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006)).
147
McEvoy, supra note 16, at 400–01; see also 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6.
148
McEvoy, supra note 16, at 400–01. Defendants must also alert the prosecution as to
any classified information they intend to introduce at trial. Id.
149
Id. at 406.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 406–07 (stating that the defendant is not entitled to view the motion).
152
18 U.S.C. § 6(c) provides:
146

(1) Upon any determination by the court authorizing the disclosure of specific classified
information under the procedures established by this section, the United States may move that, in
lieu of the disclosure of such specific classified information, the court order—(A) the
substitution for such classified information of a statement admitting relevant facts that the
specific classified information would tend to prove; or (B) the substitution for such classified
information of a summary of the specific classified information.
153

Id.
See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 157–58 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming the
trial court’s rejection of proposed substitutions that failed to inform the jury of facts deemed
essential to the defendant’s argument). A defendant has more than a basic right to present
evidence material to his defense; substituted information must go beyond the bare facts of
the case and allow the jury to understand the relevant context in which those facts are
situated. Id. at 158.
155
382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’g on reh’g 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004).
154
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relating to his purported involvement in the September 11 attacks. 156 At
trial, Moussaoui sought to introduce the testimony of individuals being held
at Guantanamo Bay. 157 The trial court determined that substituted evidence
must not “materially disadvantage the defendant.”158 The trial court denied
Moussaoui’s request for classified documents, but allowed him to depose
inmates of Guantanamo Bay. 159
The Fourth Circuit held that classified exculpatory evidence could be
introduced through the CIPA summary substitution procedure but that
inculpatory evidence could not.160 The prosecutor challenged this on the
basis of completeness. 161 He argued that drawing a stark line between
inculpatory and exculpatory statements in such an affidavit would strip it of
its usefulness; lacking context, the information summarized therein would
lack probative value for the jury. 162 The Fourth Circuit allowed the
inclusion of inculpatory information, provided the Government did not use
this “as a means of seeking the admission of inculpatory statements that
neither explain nor clarify the statements designated by Moussaoui.”163
While Moussaoui addressed a number of important issues, many still
remain. The case did not address the question of how CIPA could be used
when the prosecution sought to introduce evidence in its case-in-chief. 164
Additionally, the witnesses in the Moussaoui case were already in United
States custody. 165 The costs to the Executive would be higher if a
defendant had to be given access to individual Government witnesses who
were not in custody or not in the United States. 166 Both issues would be
relevant should FISA material be challenged on a Crawford basis.
Future trials of terrorism suspects will inevitably involve classified
information and the desire to protect such information has been a central
preoccupation of the government in resisting civil trials. 167
156

Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457.
Id. at 458.
158
Id. at 477.
159
Id. at 476.
160
Id. at 482.
161
Id. at 481. The Federal Rules of Evidence state: “When a writing or recorded
statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which
ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.” FED. R. EVID. 106.
162
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 481.
163
Id. at 482.
164
See id.
165
Id. at 465.
166
See Friedman, supra note 31, at 574.
167
See Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions,
Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
157
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III. “CONFRONTING” FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
Davis and Crawford provided a rough outline of the Court’s current
reasoning with respect to the Confrontation Clause. The standard for
determining what evidence is excluded by the Clause raises potential
problems, however, for prosecutors—specifically in the area of foreign
intelligence.
A. FISA, CIPA, AND APPLYING THE NEW CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Both FISA and Davis couch their respective analyses in the context of
intent of the government agent in collecting information.168 When that
intention is criminal prosecution, however, the exclusionary consequences
of Davis implicate the admissibility of evidence collected pursuant to FISA
and presented under CIPA.
The first question is whether foreign intelligence information can be
considered “testimonial.” To answer this, one must have a clear definition
of “testimony.” As was noted above, the Court has been vague in its
description of the standard, particularly given the attack it leveled against
Roberts. The Court tells us, however, that a statement made to police
during an interrogation is clearly testimonial because the objective declarant
would understand that this statement would be used at trial.169 According to
the Court, such accusations are precisely the type of evidence the Framers
feared based upon a historical record of executive misuse of such
statements. 170 The evidence in Crawford is of a type that falls within the
core or “nucleus” of the Clause. 171 The objective circumstances of the
interrogation made it apparent to the declarant that her statements could be
used at trial. 172 But while government interrogations may be the “easy
case” under this new standard, they are clearly not the only situation in
which “testimonial” evidence may be generated.

1407, 1413–14 (quoting Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 at § 1(f) (Nov. 16,
2001)) (“[I]t is not practicable to apply . . . the principles of law and [the] rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.”); see
also Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law in the
United States, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 135, 150 (2008) (stating that the entire trial process
under the Bush Administration was tainted by politics).
168
See supra Part II.
169
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52–53 (2004).
170
Id. at 47–50.
171
Id. at 51–52.
172
The declarant in this case was under arrest at the time she gave her statement, and had
been given a Miranda warning. Id. at 38. She was under actual (rather than constructive)
notice, therefore, that her statements could be used later at trial.
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When required to elaborate beyond this core class of statements, the
Court shifted the focus of its analysis from one that exclusively addressed
the intent of the declarant 173 to one that considered more objective
factors. 174 Specifically, the Court looked at the purpose of the government
questioning. 175 Unlike Crawford, where the interrogation was removed
both geographically and temporally from the events at issue, the statements
at issue in Davis were made in the context of “ongoing emergencies.” 176
The Court was forced to recognize that the police gather information from
the public for more reasons than simply prosecuting criminals.177 Under
ongoing emergency circumstances, statements elicited by the police would
not be testimonial because they were not made to “establish or prove some
past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police
assistance.” 178 Therefore, depending upon the surrounding circumstances,
the intentions of both the individuals making the statements and the officers
collecting them may change. Depending upon the extent of that change, the
Confrontation Clause implications of the statements may fluctuate as well.
Both are therefore relevant.
In explaining its position, the Davis Court highlighted three factors
which distinguish statements made to a 911 operator during an ongoing
emergency with those made to police officers conducting an interview:
(1) the time period in which the statement was made, 179 (2) the purpose of
the questioning, 180 and (3) the formality of the statement. 181 Interestingly,
wedged in between the two objective factors evidencing the physical
context in which the statement was made, the Court introduced to the
analysis the subjective intent of the officer. Depending upon the purpose of
the officers, the statements or information they elicit may or may not
173
Id. at 51 (defining testimony as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact”) (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
174
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (“[Statements] are testimonial when
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution.”).
175
Id.
176
Id. at 822, 827.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 827 (internal quotations omitted).
179
Specifically: was the statement contemporaneous to the events it describes? Id.
180
The Court asks rhetorically whether objectively the situation was an ongoing
emergency and whether the purpose motivating the officers to elicit the statement was
resolution of that emergency. Id.
181
Id. The statement at issue in Crawford was made “calmly,” “at the station house,”
and was taped. Id. The statement in Davis was frantic, on the phone, and in “an
environment that was not tranquil.” Id.
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qualify as “testimony.” 182 And in describing an officer’s intent, sufficient
to implicate the “testimonial evidence” standard, the Court specifically
refers to “primary purpose.” 183
Therefore, under Crawford and its progeny, the intent of both the
government and the declarant are relevant to the testimonial analysis. 184
Granted, intent is not the only factor, and the way in which all the relevant
factors interact has not been conclusively shown. In the “simple cases” of
direct police interrogation, the officer’s intention makes the consequences
of the statement obvious to the declarant: officer intention is clear and a
reasonable adult will know that the statements they make might be used
against a defendant at trial. Alternatively, in certain “non-core” situations,
officer intent may nevertheless be determinative.
While the Court in Davis clearly endorsed an objective, intent-of-theinvestigation inquiry to determine the “primary purpose” of the government
agent’s behavior, some federal and state courts have disregarded this and
focused only on the more objective factors: context and formality. 185
Specifically, several circuits have also looked at the issue of how wiretap
evidence fits into the new scheme. 186 One decision, a year after Crawford,
indicated that certain statements captured via wiretap do not constitute
testimonial evidence.187 The Third Circuit in United States v. Hendricks
held that statements recorded on a wiretap between co-conspirators were
not “testimony” because they failed the “formality” test discussed in
Crawford. 188 While this holding came before the decision in Davis, later

182

Id. at 822; Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011) (“In addition to the
circumstances in which an encounter occurs, the statements and actions of both the declarant
and interrogators provide objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation.”).
183
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
184
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Pilar G. Kraman, Divining the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Intent: Applying Crawford and Davis to Multipurpose Interrogations
by Non-Law Enforcement Personnel, 23 CRIM. JUST. 30, 33 (2009) (“In Crawford, the
Supreme Court focused on the objective view of the declarant; and in Davis the Court
created the so-called primary purpose test that focused on the interrogator.”); see also Davis,
547 U.S. at 822.
185
See generally United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The
proper inquiry . . . is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused.”).
186
See, e.g., United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding
that written approval of a wiretap authorization was admissible under Crawford); United
States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a wiretapped
discussion between co-conspirators was not excluded under Crawford); United States v.
Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that co-conspirator statements
from a wiretap were admissible under Roberts and Crawford).
187
Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 183–84.
188
See id. at 181. A witness “who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
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courts also focused on the “formality” element when evaluating the
admissibility of recorded statements between co-conspirators. 189
There is reason, however, to believe that the formality element is not
the whole story. 190 Like in Crawford, the holding in Davis focused on
interrogations. The Court indicated, however, that the scope of the new test
might incorporate statements generated in other circumstances as well:
Our holding refers to interrogations because . . . the statements in the cases presently
before us are the products of interrogations—which in some circumstances tend to
generate testimonial responses. This is not to imply, however, that statements made in
the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The Framers were no
more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to
191
open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.

Specifically responding to the attempt by Justice Thomas in his
concurring opinion to classify testimonial evidence based upon formality,
the Court questioned whether such a test is “workable.” 192
The Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts drew on this dicta and
held that formal interrogation (or any government questioning whatsoever)
is not required under the Confrontation Clause to produce testimony. In
Melendez-Diaz, the Court analyzed a challenge to a chemical analysis
report and affidavit completed by a lab technician in a narcotics case.193
When arresting the defendant, police discovered several small plastic bags
containing a fine white power. 194 The powder was submitted to the
not.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. The Title III recordings here at issue are much more similar
to the latter than the former.
189
United States v. Valle-Martinez, 336 F. App’x 720, 724 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]
question posed by the other speaker was not ‘testimonial.’”); United States v. Fleming, F.
App’x 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2008) (determining that video tapes of defendant meeting with
confidential informant did not qualify as testimonial because they were not “solemn
declarations”); United States v. Davis, 270 F. App’x 236, 248 n.9 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that
statements by a confidential informant on a wiretap, not introduced for truth of the matter
asserted, were non-testimonial); see also United States v. Emmanuel 565 F.3d 1324, 1333
(11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a Crawford challenge to wiretap authorization was not
preserved for trial).
190
Friedman, supra note 31, at 567 (“A statement is not rendered non-testimonial by the
absence of formalities . . . . A rule that only formal statements will be characterized as
testimonial is . . . theoretically backwards.”).
191
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822–23 n.1 (2006). In addition, the majority
opinion casts doubt on the position that “formality” and “solemn” declaration are
interchangeable. Id. at 830–31 n.5.
192
Id. at 830–31 n.5. (“The dissent, in attempting to formulate an exhaustive
classification of its own, has not provided anything that deserves the description
‘workable”—unless one thinks that the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’
statements . . . qualifies.”).
193
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
194
Id. at 2530.
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Massachusetts state crime laboratory for analysis.195 The tests determined
the substance was cocaine. 196 The technician who performed the tests did
not testify at trial, but did provide a “certificate of analysis” describing the
weight of the bags, the tests performed and the results.197 The defendant
was found guilty. 198 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the verdict,
holding that such reports are inadmissible.199
The certificate at issue in that case was prepared specifically for use at
the petitioner’s trial. This type of government-prepared evidence is
analogous to the statement of Lord Cobham introduced against Sir. Walter
Raleigh. 200 For the same reasons the Court highlights in Crawford, the
certificate is inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. 201 This case,
however, did not fully resolve the distinction between the subjective intent
of the declarant and the objective intent of the interrogation.
The utility of focusing too much on objective factors indicating
declarant intent breaks down, however, if the declarant cannot be
reasonably expected to understand how those factors impact the
consequences of their statements. For example, this problem is obvious in
the context of child witnesses. 202 The Supreme Court of Oregon held in
State v. Mack that the statements made by a three-year-old witness about
alleged sexual abuse fell within the core class of testimonial hearsay
excluded under Crawford. 203 In determining that the statements were
testimonial, however, the court did not evaluate them based upon declarant
intent. 204 A declarant-centric test would result in admission of evidence
that “would offend” Crawford’s rigid standards. 205 In this case, rather, the
testimony was deemed testimonial as the child’s statements were elicited by
a caseworker at the behest of police officers. 206 The officers’ intent, not the
declarant’s, was determinative. Oregon is not alone; other states have

195

Id.
Id.
197
Id. at 2531.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 2532.
200
Id. at 2535.
201
Id.
202
Kraman, supra note 184, at 32 (noting that various state courts do not look at
declarant intent in the context of children and that this result makes sense if the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to collect evidence for trial).
203
101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004).
204
Id.
205
Kraman, supra note 184.
206
Mack, 101 P.3d at 353.
196
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followed suit by utilizing an analysis that evaluates the subjective intent of
the investigators, not only the subjective awareness of the declarant.207
Assuming that objective factors like formality are not determinative in
judging “testimonial” evidence, the CIPA and the 2002 Protocols for FISA
may raise significant confrontation problems.
A showing of primary purpose is the thread that connects the Fourth
and Sixth Amendments in this case. In both Supreme Court Confrontation
Clause cases after Crawford, the Court articulated the Clause’s overarching
aim of excluding ex parte testimonial evidence generated by the
government. 208 The Court takes the position that the testimonial standard
has a broad reach. 209 By inquiring into the officers’ intention in eliciting
statements in Davis, the Court opened the testimonial standard to
encompass both freely given, and possibly surreptitiously recorded,
statements. 210 The holdings in both Davis and Crawford only address
actual police interrogation. Advances in technology since the trial of
Walter Raleigh have made the government less dependent upon the
interrogations of witnesses, but the danger of government abuse remains the
same. There is no apparent reason why evidence collected through wiretaps
or physical searches could not be deemed testimonial if it satisfies the
Crawford and Davis criteria. 211
Let us therefore turn to the statutes themselves. The Court in Davis
indicated that the primary purpose of an interrogation was relevant in
deciding whether a statement was testimonial.212 If that purpose is criminal
prosecution, the statement may be found testimonial, and therefore
barred. 213 FISA has become a powerful law enforcement tool, and one in
which the government has shown great interest.214 Under the more lax
207

See People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 357 (Ill. 2007); People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205,
216 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1023 (2007); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 924–26
(Colo. 2006).
208
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009); Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006).
209
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
210
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
211
Justice Scalia specifically notes in Davis that statements made in the absence of
interrogation can be testimonial and therefore excluded under the Confrontation Clause. Id.
at 822–23 n.1.
212
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (holding that when the circumstances indicate that the primary
purpose of government action is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
future prosecution, the statements made are testimonial); see also Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 359
(noting the Davis Court’s focus on the intent of the police-questioner).
213
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
214
Since 2002, the number of FISA applications has almost doubled. In 2002, the
government applied for, and was granted, 1228 FISA warrants. In 2007 the government
applied for 2371 and received 2370. This is a 93% increase. Electronic Privacy Information
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standards for FISA warrants in the wake of September 11, the FBI may
utilize FISA in instances where criminal prosecution is the primary purpose
of the investigation, so long as foreign intelligence gathering is a significant
purpose. 215 Given the DOJ’s new protocols, involvement by prosecutors is
encouraged during FISA investigations. 216
It should be noted that both the Supreme Court and the lower courts
have said the testimonial standard does not reach statements made in the
furtherance of a conspiracy. 217 This would seem to carve out a chunk of the
information collected through FISA wiretaps. But it does not exempt
wiretaps in general. If the Court is serious about tying the Confrontation
Clause to its seventeenth-century common law roots, a blanket prohibition
on all wiretap evidence seems unlikely. Even though the Court bases its
definition on the common law understanding of testimony growing out of
the Raleigh trial, logical consistency demands at least some attention be
paid to the advances of technology in the last two hundred and fifty years.
As Justice Brandeis pointed out in Olmstead, technology provides the
government with means of gathering information more subtle than direct
interrogation. 218 In Raleigh’s day, collecting evidence was largely limited
to face-to-face statements. 219 Now the government has far more subtle
means of gathering information about its citizenry.
The Court itself has hinted at this more expansive reading. In
Crawford, the majority took issue with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
concurrence, which attempted to insulate existing hearsay exceptions such
as the co-conspirator exception, from augmentation. Justice Scalia notes:
Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye
toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time
and again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar. This
consideration does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad,
modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in other
220
circumstances.

Whether an accusatory statement is made to a police officer or to
another person on a tapped phone line, the result is the same: the
Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1879–2009, (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html.
215
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) (2006).
216
2002 Protocols, supra note 131.
217
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
218
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
219
Intelligence gathering was limited to eavesdropping, which at the time literally meant
standing outside a home and listening. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 45 (J.A. Simpson &
E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989) (defining eavesdrop: “To stand within the ‘eavesdrop’ of a
house in order to listen to secrets.”).
220
Crawford, 547 U.S. at 56 n.7; see also id. at 73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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government has collected information, useful for subsequent prosecution, to
which it otherwise would not be privy. Given this, it seems apparent that
the purpose of a wiretap is relevant to the issue of whether the statements
gathered through its use are admissible under Davis and Crawford.
Unfortunately, under this new testimonial standard, this evidence would be
excluded regardless of its reliability.
Like evidence generated through FISA warrants, evidence introduced
through CIPA procedures may be barred under the Confrontation Clause.
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that lab reports were barred under
Crawford. 221 In the foreign intelligence context, the most analogous
document to the lab reports excluded in Melendez-Diaz is the substitute
evidence provided by the government under CIPA. In that context, the
Court extended the bounds of excluded testimonial evidence past mere
perception witnesses. 222 By crossing this barrier, the Court nullified many
of the policy arguments that might support an exception for CIPA. The
voluntariness of a CIPA substitution, the relative contemporaneous nature
of its recording, and the fact that it does not (itself) make a direct criminal
accusation, are all irrelevant to the determination of its admissibility. 223
Moreover, under the historic examples of governmental abuses drawn by
the Court in its prior holdings, the affidavits at issue in Melendez-Diaz were
significantly more innocuous than substitute evidence under CIPA, 224 and
arguably more damning than wiretap information gleaned from FISA
warrants.
B. THE COSTS OF CONFRONTATION

The federal government has significant powers to prosecute
international terrorism, and in the past decade it has had cause for
exercising those powers. 225 Should Crawford’s testimonial exclusion apply

221

See infra section III.B.1.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2009) (holding that it does
not matter if the statement is not “conventional” or of a type typically considered by the
Court in the context of Confrontation).
223
See id.
224
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (stating ex parte examination of the sort used at Raleigh’s
trial have “long been thought a paradigmatic confrontation violation.”).
225
Under federal law, individuals can be prosecuted for terrorist acts committed both on
United States soil as well as abroad. Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution,
and the Preventative Detention Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 677–78 (2009) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2332b(a), (c) (2006)). The federal government can charge an individual for murder
of a U.S. national committed on U.S. soil upon issuance of a certificate by the Attorney
General. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (2006). This presents the problem of trying cases where the
scene of the crime and witnesses might be located thousands of miles away from the
courthouse.
222
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to evidence either collected under FISA’s warrants or introduced through
CIPA, however, the result would complicate the already challenging task
facing federal prosecutors. 226 Excluding evidence gathered under FISA’s
new permissive standard would mitigate some of the risks associated with
allowing criminal investigation under the aegis of intelligence gathering. 227
In the context of domestic prosecutions, the benefits of such exclusion
might outweigh the cost. On the other hand, the exclusion of evidence
collected under FISA warrants in terrorism trials would be more
problematic.
Additionally, finding CIPA’s substitution procedures
unconstitutional would disrupt a necessary, if imperfect, legislative
balancing act. In context of both statutes, the complexity and importance of
the competing interests demands a legislative solution that weighs the
demands of the parties. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of when Crawford takes governmental interests into consideration
in its new standard last spring. The answer was a resounding “never.”
1. Melendez-Diaz: Costs Begin to Come into Focus
The Court in both Davis and Crawford implies that its new rule is less
complex and open to interpretation than the prior reasonableness standard.
By imposing a “wooden” standard, 228 the Court has attempted to clamp
down on inappropriate judicial judgment calls.229 Yet even with this
standard, the analysis the lower courts must undertake is no less opaque.
And the resultant uncertainty imposes costs on both defendants and
prosecutors. 230 Unlike Roberts, where the parties shared the burden of
uncertainties, here challenges posed by the practical applications of
Crawford seem directed exclusively at prosecutors. 231
Since the Crawford decision came down in 2004, legal scholars have
attempted to draw attention to the potential costs this new standard would

226

See S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 2 (1980).
It certainly would not fix all the problems, however.
228
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
229
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[W]e do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous
notions of ‘reliability.’”).
230
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2545. Writing after the Davis opinion came down,
Richard Friedman predicts the possibility that as a consequence of the Court’s primary
purpose language, the new standard may only impose costs on the prosecution. Friedman,
supra note 31, at 574–75 (noting that there are situations where a court may deem evidence
testimonial, but the expense of providing a live witness is exorbitant and the accused seems
to have no plausible expectation that confrontation would do him any good) (citing Metzger,
supra note 8)).
231
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2545.
227
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impose. 232 The first practical question to be taken up by the Court was
decided in June 2009. 233 The Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts was
asked to determine whether the costs to the government could be considered
under its new standard. 234 The Court responded “no” and emphasized that
the burden of its new standard lay squarely at the prosecutor’s feet. 235
“[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to
present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses
to court.” 236
The majority in Melendez-Diaz commented on how the question of lab
reports/affidavits called for a “straightforward” application of the
testimonial standard from Crawford. 237 While the declarant in Crawford
was determined to have been objectively aware that her words could be
used later at trial, the statements contained in the report and affidavit at
issue in Melendez-Diaz were made with the actual intent that they be
introduced at trial.238
The prosecution put forward four arguments attempting to distinguish
the declarant in this case from other types of perception witnesses. 239 They
argued that the technician is not an “accusatory” witness or one who
directly accuses the defendant of wrongdoing. 240 They argued that the
technician is not “conventional” in that they did not observe the facts salient
to the crime. 241 They asserted that because the statements were not elicited
through interrogation they fall outside of the Crawford/Davis rule. 242 And
finally, they pointed out that the witness is not recounting historic facts

232

Some of the cost issues which have thus far been raised include those related to child
testimony and testimony in domestic abuse cases. See Kimberly Y. Chin, “Minute and
Separate”: Considering the Admissibility of Videotaped Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases After Crawford and Davis, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 71 (2010); G.
Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and Melendez-Diaz), 43
CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 80–81 (2009). Battered women and abused children are frequently
the only witnesses to the crimes perpetrated on them, but are often unable or unwilling to
testify. See Craig M. Bradley, Melendez-Diaz and the Right to Confrontation, 85 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 315, 327 (2009). In such instances, a rigid confrontation rule would bar charges
from being brought. Id.
233
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2527.
234
Id. at 2540.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 2532–33.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 2533.
241
Id. at 2535.
242
Id.
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“prone to distortion” but rather reporting scientific fact, the “result of
neutral, scientific testing.” 243
The Court, however, held that none of these factors are relevant to its
Confrontation Clause analysis. It may be true, the majority noted, “that
there are other ways—and in some cases better ways—to challenge or
verify the results of a forensic test. But the Constitution guarantees one
way: confrontation. We do not have license to suspend the Confrontation
Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available.”244
2. Costs Specific to Terrorism Trials 245
Given its responsibilities enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, the
Executive has certain recognized interests in collecting foreign
intelligence. 246 The Executive also has the responsibility to prosecute
suspected criminals.247 These interests can coincide, and when they do, the
competing interests of fair trial and information control need to be
reconciled. In the context of international terrorism prosecutions, one
particular problem is the government’s limited ability to compel appearance
of potentially relevant witnesses. 248 The general solution to this problem
has been the hearsay exceptions articulated in the Federal Rules of

243
Id. at 2536 (internal quotations omitted). The State also pointed out that the
documents are akin to business records admissible at common law. Id. at 2538.
244
Id. at 2536.
245
For a discussion of some of the costs specific to terrorism trials, see Chesney, supra
note 225, at 705 (noting that while there are few examples of terrorism trials being derailed
due to adverse evidentiary rulings, what is unclear is the extent to which individuals are not
being criminally prosecuted because of procedural evidentiary hurdles); see generally S. REP.
NO. 96-823 (1980).
246
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 476 n.26
(4th Cir. 2004) (“The Government is charged not only with the task of bringing wrongdoers
to justice, but also with the grave responsibility of protecting the lives of the citizenry.”).
247
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed . . . .”); see also United States v. Sitka, 666 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D. Conn.
1987) (“This duty to execute the laws is a broad power not specifically limited to powers
enumerated in the text of the Constitution.”).
248
In the United States, defendants have the right to secure the attendance of witnesses
on the issuance of a subpoena by the courts. United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. 341 (1800)
(Opinion of Chase, J.). Under federal law, a court can issue a subpoena on an individual
living outside of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2006), see also Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (upholding a statute under which a U.S. national living abroad
was held in contempt for failing to comply with a subpoena issued by a federal court). That
being said, the Court in Blackmer stated that its holding was based upon its in personum
jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 438. While federal courts now analyze the issue
through the lens of “minimum contacts,” the consequence remains the same: non-citizen
witnesses living abroad are not necessarily subject to federal process. See Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Evidence. 249 In the context of foreign intelligence, specifically, Congress
has created a flexible regulatory scheme designed to address the competing
interests through evidentiary substitution. 250
Since the government amended the FISA standards in 2001, evidence
gathered pursuant to these warrants has played an increasingly significant
role at trial. 251 Terrorism trials tend to involve a great deal of electronic
surveillance. 252 In one case from 2003, United States v. Al-Arian, the
evidence at trial included 21,000 hours of telephone recordings collected
under FISA. 253 The evidence in another case from 2004, United States v.
Hassoun, included 275 transcripts of recorded conversations and over 300
summaries of those intercepts, whittled down from 10,000 to 12,000 pages
of materials. 254 In a third case, United States v. Sattar, the Government
made extensive disclosures prior to trial including 85,000 audio recordings,
written summaries of 5,300 voice calls, and 10,000 pages of e-mails. 255
The ability to collect and store vast quantities of information has not
made the process of analyzing that information any less costly. This is a
challenge not just for the federal government during terrorism trials but for
civil discovery procedures in general. 256 Mandating that individuals testify
as to the contents of thousands of hours of recorded phone conversations—
when the contents of those conversations bear adequate indicia of reliability
on their own–would be a waste of the court’s time.
Moreover, the challenges of having individuals testify to such
voluminous information assumes that the Government even has access to
the declarants who are recorded on the relevant tapes. Should the courts
determine that the significant purpose standard for FISA warrants triggers
the “testimonial” exclusion at trial, terrorism trials in Article III courts will
require the production of all the individuals making statement on these
tapes. This is a difficult prospect. FISA warrants cover conversations

249

ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 107 (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evidence
have largely been up to the task in the context of terrorism trials).
250
Id. at 85.
251
See infra note 253.
252
Id.
253
267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2003). The defendant in this case was
prosecuted for allegedly providing material support to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a militia
organization in Palestine. Id.
254
ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 78 (citing Protective Order, United States v.
Hassoun, No. 04-cr-60001 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2004) (Dkt. No. 34)).
255
No. 02 CR. 395 JGK, 2003 WL 22137012, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003).
256
ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91; see also Robert W. Trenchard, Two Roads
Diverge in Managing E-Discovery Costs, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 2009, at S6.

1070

JOHN SCOTT

[Vol. 101

between individuals in the United States and elsewhere.257 Locating and
transporting such individuals to domestic courts may prove impossible.258
In addition to the admissibility of FISA evidence generally, an
overlapping issue is the procedure for admitting classified information.
Congress passed CIPA in order to balance the interests of prosecution and
defense specifically in the context of classified evidence.259 The issues
raised in Moussaoui have yet to reach the Supreme Court, but on its face,
the Fourth Circuit’s decision raises significant Crawford questions. While
ostensibly situating its holding under the new testimonial standard, the
Fourth Circuit in Moussaoui fell back on a balancing standard reminiscent
of Roberts. 260 Despite the fact that the evidence was being used to
contextualize other exculpatory evidence, the court allowed introduction of
inculpatory evidence against the defendant by means of government
affidavit. 261 Under all three Supreme Court decisions describing the
testimonial rule, such an affidavit would be inadmissible. Plus, any
mention of “reliability” at all would seem to place it squarely in the
Crawford crosshairs.
The challenge that classified information poses for trial practice is as
great as the interests at stake are significant.262 Since its passage in 1980,

257

50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006).
There are a number of strategies which have been utilized by courts attempting to
mitigate the challenges associated with in person testimony. Zabel and Benjamin provide a
comprehensive description of many of the steps taken by courts to accommodate these
unique challenges. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 109; see United States v. Ressam
593 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing pre-Crawford trial verdict against petitioner
after court had allowed the deposition of a witness living outside the United States to be
introduced as evidence at trial); United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1312–18 (11th Cir.
2006) (allowing video conferencing of witness unable to participate at trial). In Yates, the
court noted Justice Scalia’s objection to this type of evidence on confrontation grounds. Id.
at 1314–15.
259
Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)
(codified in 18 U.S.C. app 3 (2006)); S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 3 (1980) (“The purpose of this
bill is to help ensure that the intelligence agencies are subject to the rule of law and to help
strengthen the enforcement of laws designed to protect both national security and civil
liberties. Too often the duty of the government to protect legitimate national security secrets
and to prosecute lawbreakers have been in conflict. Insofar as possible, [this bill] resolves
that conflict.”).
260
United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 468 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Moussaoui . . . has a
Sixth Amendment right to [detainees’] testimony . . . [but] this right must be balanced
against the Government’s legitimate interest in preventing disruption [Redacted] of the
enemy combatant witnesses.”).
261
Id. at 482.
262
Chesney, supra note 225, at 708 (“[W]hile it may be possible [to present declarants at
trial] in many instances . . . presumably it will not be possible in some non-trivial number of
cases.”).
258
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courts have upheld the constitutionality of CIPA procedures. 263 Starting in
the 1980s, it has been heavily relied upon in terrorism cases. 264 It has found
success precisely because it is a flexible standard, capable of adapting to the
ever-changing prosecutorial environment. 265 The Supreme Court, however,
has been explicit in its rejection of any flexibility or balancing of interests
in the context of Confrontation. 266 This contradicts the express intention of
Congress in fashioning this statue.267 Moreover, CIPA, while not perfect,
does function to ensure that both sides are able to put on an effective
case. 268 To remove this scheme would prompt the return of tactics such as
“graymail,” which serve only to obstruct the trial process. 269
Safeguards are needed to protect defendants’ rights at trial, and
confrontation is a critical tool for testing the validity and reliability of
evidence. 270 But the Federal Rules of Evidence have existed for thirty-five
years, 271 and have been shown to provide adequate safeguards against the
introduction of unreliable testimony. 272 The Court should return to the
Roberts reliability standard, not because it provides less protection to the
interests of the defendant, but rather because it is more consistent with the
aims of the Confrontation Clause itself.
Alternatively, should the Court stand pat, terrorism suspects will not
be able to avoid prosecution by “gaming the system” by invoking their
constitutional rights. Rather, the government will shift the forum of
263
United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL
628059, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2007); United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023
LBS., 2001 WL 66393, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2001).
264
ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 85 (citing e.g., United States v. Warsame, No.
04-cr-00029, 2007 WL 74828, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2007); United States v. Salah, 462 F.
Supp. 2d 915, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2006); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1142–43 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
265
See United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 796 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“CIPA is
neither exhaustive nor explicitly exclusive with respect to the presentation of classified
testimony or documents at trial.”).
266
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009) (holding that despite
the “burden[some]” “necessities of the trial and adversarial process” this new standard may
entail, the Court cannot water down the rule it has articulated) (internal quotations omitted).
267
ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 85 (“Congress’ express intent in enacting CIPA
was that federal district judges . . . ‘must be relied upon to fashion creative and fair solutions
to these problems.’”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-283 (1980)).
268
Id. at 87 (“Prior evaluations of CIPA have found that CIPA is effective not only in
espionage prosecutions but in terrorism prosecutions as well.”) (internal quotations omitted).
269
See McEvoy, supra note 16, at 405.
270
Metzger, supra note 8, at 501 (noting that each aspect of the Confrontation Clause
serves to advance the “search for reliability”).
271
Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. No.
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
272
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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prosecution—most likely to military tribunals.273 In essence, by requiring
that evidence collected pursuant to FISA warrants always be introduced via
live testimony, the Court is incentivizing the use of military tribunals over
Article III courts. And these tribunals provide significantly fewer
protections for detainees than they would enjoy under the return to a
Roberts formulation. 274 More generally, these tribunals weaken our
commitment to the rule of law at home while decimating the legitimacy of
our legal system abroad.
IV. CONCLUSION: OVERTURN CRAWFORD, REWRITE FISA, OR . . . BOTH?
The Obama Administration has indicated that it believes trying
terrorism suspects in Article III courts, with all the rights and privileges that
such trials entail, is a worthy goal. 275 This is a laudable position. The
demand for terrorism prosecutions will only become more frequent in the
future. 276 The attempts to limit the rights of individuals accused of
273

It is possible that the Confrontation Clause issue would not necessarily be resolved by
restricting terrorism trials to military courts. Justice Scalia takes great pains to justify his
holding in Crawford on the basis of common law principles and fundamental values of the
judicial process. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004); Dratel, supra note 5, at
20. The opinion did not just rely on the meaning of confrontation in the abstract, but found
the genesis of the right outside of the four corners of the Constitution. Crawford, 541 U.S. at
43; Dratel, supra note 5, at 20. Therefore, it could be argued that even defendants facing
trial before military tribunals might be able to challenge testimonial evidence. If this were
the case, the challenges of Crawford might be exacerbated by the Court’s holding in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Conspiracy is not recognized as a crime under
the law of war. Id. at 603–04. Should the Court not recognize a conspiracy, statements that
might otherwise be barred under the Confrontation Clause, could now be introduced.
274
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at
10 U.S.C. §§ 948–50 (2006)) (enacting Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code
and amending § 2241 of Title 28). In recent months, we are actually seeing evidence of an
even more disturbing third alternative: targeted killings. Karen DeYoung & Joby Warrick,
For Obama Administration, Fatal Blows Take Precedence, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2010, at
A1 (discussing how the difficulty of dealing with terrorism suspects captured alive has
disincentivized their capture and trial for the U.S. government).
275
Jerry Markon, Terror Trials in U.S. Are a Worry, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2009, at A4
(“Obama’s nominee for Pentagon general counsel recently told a Senate committee that the
president’s ‘predispositions’ are for civilian trials.”).
276
Despite being a party to the drafting Rome Statute, the United States has refused to
ratify and join the International Criminal Court (ICC). While one might argue that crimes
like international terrorism are best suited for an international forum like the ICC, the United
States may be fully capable of exercising jurisdiction over terrorists committing purely
international crimes without the ICC. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, any state
has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the
community of nations as of universal concern. These include piracy, slave trade, aircraft
hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404. This power is not completely unbounded, and as it has become
more frequently utilized, there have been stronger and more frequent calls to curtail it. Dapo
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terrorism in the last decade by subjecting them to ad hoc military tribunals
has resulted in only five convictions. 277 Conversely, of the 449 defendants
charged with terrorism or national security crimes in civilian courts since
September 11, 271 have settled with 230 ending in convictions. 278
Nevertheless, despite the impotence of extrajudicial detention at
Guantanamo Bay, a political backlash has stymied the Administration’s
attempt to focus on prosecuting terrorists in domestic courts. 279 Civilian
courts have shown that they are capable of handling terrorism trials. 280
There have been setbacks as well. 281 The challenges that Crawford poses
could lend fuel to this particular fire.
In November 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four alleged accomplices would be tried in
federal court in Manhattan.282 Despite an initial outpouring of support for
this proposal, opposition soon began to build in the city against allowing
this to go forward. 283 This sentiment echoed the resistance to moving the
suspects held at Guantanamo Bay to United States soil. While much of the
criticism has centered on the costs and security concerns associated with
both the trial 284 and the transfer, 285 critics have been willing to critique the
premise that accused terrorists should be afforded the right to civilian
trial. 286
Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign
Domestic Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 815, 847–48 (2010).
277
Clyde Haberman, Verdict Replies to Terrorists and to Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2011, at A23.
278
Id.
279
Shane, supra note 3.
280
Haberman, supra note 277.
281
Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Indefinite Detention Possible for Suspects at
Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2010, at A3 (describing Administration plans for
“indefinite detention” executive order).
282
Savage, supra note 2. In April, the Obama Administration abandoned its plans to try
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in civilian court. Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials
for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at A1.
283
Shane, supra note 3.
284
Al Baker, Security for Terrorism Trials Estimated at $200 Million a Year, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010 at A25 (describing the costs associated with trying 9/11 suspects in
Manhattan).
285
Charlie Savage, U.S. to Move Detainees to Illinois, Offical Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2009 at A26.
286
Julie Kirtz, With New York All but Ruled Out, Lawmakers Look for Cheap, Safe Spot
for 9/11 Trials, FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 31, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2010/01/31/new-york-ruled-lawmakers-look-cheap-safe-spot-trials (“I think we ought to
have three criteria. Number one, where can we try them safely? Where can we try them
quickly? And where can we try them inexpensively? I’m for whichever venue accomplishes
those things.”) (quoting Sen. Evan Bayh) (internal quotation omitted); Charlie Savage,
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As much as political opponents of the Obama Administration’s initial
plan may wish the opposite to be true, military tribunals are not the best
forum for trying international terrorists.287 Before courts are ready to take
on trials of alleged terrorists, however, the Supreme Court needs to provide
a more definite explanation of “testimonial” evidence. Too many questions
remain as to the “new” scope of the Confrontation Clause. Terrorism
prosecutions present unique challenges to federal prosecutors. The Court’s
opinion in Melendez-Diaz expressed little concern for the very real
logistical challenges the broad testimonial rule announced in that case
would imply. 288 Requiring that individuals testify in person to all steps of
the chain of custody would require individual custodians to spend
significant amounts of time in court and not doing the substantive work
they are charged with. 289 Local and state government agencies are already
understaffed, and while it may be too early to see the true impact of
Melendez-Diaz, the decision no doubt imposes real costs on prosecutors
which will inevitably translate into fewer legitimate cases being brought to
trial. 290
These logistical challenges are multiplied many times in the context of
foreign intelligence. Congress enacted CIPA because it understood that the
disclosure of classified information involved real costs.291 The inevitable
impact of the imposition of these costs was the inclination to pursue fewer

Holder Defends Decision to Use U.S. Court for 9/11 Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at
A18 (describing political opposition to trying 9/11 suspects in civilian courts); Danny
Hakim, Patterson Calls Obama Wrong On 9/11 Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009 at A26
(“[H]aving those terrorists tried so close to the attack is going to be an encumbrance on all
New Yorkers.”) (quoting Gov. David A. Paterson).
287
See Haberman, supra note 277 (noting that there have been 230 convictions of
terrorism suspects in federal civilian courts since September 11, compared with just five in
military commissions).
288
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2544–45 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s new Confrontation Clause standard “threatens to disrupt
if not end many prosecutions where guilt is clear but a newly found formalism now holds
sway”).
289
Id. at 2544 (arguing that, since many “people play a role in a routine test for the
presence of illegal drugs[,]” it is difficult to determine which person “is the analyst to be
confronted under [the majority’s rule]”).
290
Id; see generally Craig M. Cooley, The CSI Effect: Its Impact and Potential
Concerns, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 471, 474 (2007) (“[A] lack of qualified forensic scientists
[has led] to understaffing and ultimately massive backlogs.”).
291
S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 3 (1980) (“The Government’s understandable reluctance to
compromise national security information invites defendants and their counsel to press for
the release of sensitive classified information the threatened disclosure of which might force
the government to drop the prosecution.”) (quoting Attorney General Philip Heymann).
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criminal convictions. 292 If the Court was to prohibit evidence collected
through FISA warrants, and instead insist that individuals recorded under
those warrants testify in person, similar costs would be imposed.
Therefore, in addition to providing a more definite definition of
testimonial evidence, the Obama Administration and the Congress should
abandon the significant purpose test articulated in both the PATRIOT Act
and the 2002 Protocols. The Supreme Court has not weighed in on this
issue, so perhaps its dismissal of the test will force the Executive’s hand.
But regardless, adhering to the significant purpose analysis raises practical
problems more immediate than the potential constitutional ones. Fostering
a culture of information sharing within government is a positive goal, but
the significant purpose test is not the right way to do this. A clear
demarcation between domestic investigations and foreign intelligence
investigations is essential to the success of both. There is a strong need for
more comprehensive foreign intelligence tools, but given the risks involved,
they cannot be conflated with existing law enforcement practices.
Integrating the two puts the government’s ability to successfully prosecute
offenders at risk. This will make the government less willing to use Article
III courts, or more willing to flout their determinations if they dismiss
claims for evidentiary problems.
A. RETHINK FISA’S PRIMARY PURPOSE STANDARD

The most obvious solution to this problem is to repeal the PATRIOT
Act’s augmentation of the preexisting FISA warrant standard. If the
Congress is serious about FISA being a foreign intelligence-gathering
tool—rather than a criminal prosecution tool—there is no reason justifying
this standard. FISA already removes the obligation that the government
demonstrate probable cause to secure a warrant—the permissive significant
purpose standard practically removes the need for any showing at all.293

292

Id. at 2 (“The more sensitive the information compromised, the more difficult it
becomes to enforce the laws that guard our national security.”) (quoting STAFF OF SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE,
95th CONG., REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
(Comm. Print 1978)).
293
The federal district court in Mayfield v. United States held in 2007 that the new
standard violated the Constitution as a Title III warrant was necessary whenever the primary
purpose of an investigation is criminal prosecution. 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1041 (D. Or.
2007). This decision was overturned by the Ninth Circuit on the basis of standing without
reaching the merits of the claim. Mayfield v. United States, 588 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir.
2009).
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B. RETHINK CRAWFORD

A second priority is to overturn Crawford. The Court, however, has
made it clear that government interest is not a factor to consider in its new
standard, and so policy arguments may fall on deaf ears.294 Nevertheless, in
addition to the specific problems raised by this standard in the context of
foreign intelligence evidence, there are deeper structural questions about the
justification for the Crawford standard on its own. Specifically, it seems
suspect that the testimonial standard has any basis in the actual
Constitution.
In Crawford, while the Court parses the historic record for justification
of the new standard, it refuses to define specifically what “testimonial”
evidence really means in the context of actual practice. 295 After thirty-two
pages, the Court ends its opinion by acknowledging that it has not provided
a definition of “testimonial” evidence: “We leave for another day any effort
to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”296 Without such a
definition, the utility of the testimonial test remained suspect.297 While
courts have attempted several times to fill in this blank spot in the years
since Crawford, uncertainty remains as to its true scope. 298 The Court itself
acknowledges that the Clause could cover a variety of circumstances: ex

294

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009).
This line of analysis may be questionable in and of itself given that questioning and
interrogation by police officers—the subject of Crawford and Davis—was a topic that the
common law had not dealt with in 1789. See Bradley, supra note 232, at 322.
296
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The most recent decision has
provided some clarification by incorporating the traditional hearsay analysis into the primary
purpose determination. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011). Still, as there
seems to be some conflict with the initial motivations of the Court when deciding Crawford,
it appears plausible that further clarification is still warranted. See id. at 1174 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[The majority opinion] is a gross distortion of the law—a revisionist narrative
in which reliability continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence . . . .”).
297
While addressing very different subject matter, Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm for the
testimonial standard in Crawford is reminiscent of his dissent in Mistretta v. United States.
488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989). Both tests reject any sort of ad hoc evaluation, and focus rather
on the “character” of the power or right at issue. Id. at 427; Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004). Confrontation, much like delegation, is a practice that does not lend
itself to bright-line rules. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72. While it may be conceptually
easier to impose a rigid ban on introducing ex parte testimonial evidence or delegating
legislative powers to the courts, the practical demands of both the lawmaking and criminal
justice systems demand a more nuanced and flexible guidebook.
298
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (“[Holding, w]ithout attempting
to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements . . . .”); see also United
States v. Arnold 486 F.3d 177, 187 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that Crawford did not provide a
“comprehensive definition” of the term “testimonial”); United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d
1287, 1300 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court declined to rigidly define what is meant
by the term ‘testimonial.’”).
295
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parte sworn statements such as affidavits, prior testimony, unsworn
statements to police officers, or even in-court statements. 299 Without
defining the outer bounds of testimony, application of this rule is no less
fluid than a reliability standard and is subject to the same judicial
uncertainty.
The problem stems from the Court’s shaky foundation supporting the
primacy of testimonial evidence in the Sixth Amendment.300 As said above,
the central challenge of Confrontation Clause analysis is resolving the
tension between the facially restrictive wording of the Clause and the
realities of a functional justice system. The Court in Crawford implies that
too much evidence was getting in under the Roberts standard, and therefore
sought to impose restrictions. 301 It seems to be able to avoid the potential
pitfall of overextending the Clause by drawing a distinction between
“evidence” and “testimony.” Barring “testimonial” evidence keeps a great
deal of problematic ex parte statements out, while not simultaneously
imposing an unworkable rule.
The question, however, is why the Court can focus on the “bearing of
testimony” as the essence of what it means to be a witness. 302 The concept
of “testimony” is the keystone that links “witness”—the word that appears
in the text of the Confrontation Clause–and the ex parte formal statements
and affidavits the Court is trying to exclude. 303 The definition that the
Court uses is drawn from the 1828 edition of Webster’s New American
Dictionary. 304 Having cited only one dictionary definition, however, the
299

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–52. The Court raises but then dismisses the last category,
in-court statements, but does so on the basis of the historic precedent it has identified, not
any intrinsic quality of “testimony” itself. Id. at 50. “[W]e once again reject the view that
the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony . . . . Leaving
the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the
Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.
Raleigh was, after all, perfectly free to confront those who read Cobham’s confession in
court.” Id. at 50–51.
300
Id. at 69–70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The classification of testimonial versus
non-testimonial evidence is arbitrary, at least with regards to the common law. Id. The law
of testimony non-exclusion was fully developed at the time of the framing. Id. at 72. Given
that the law of exclusion was in the midst of developing, there is no reason to suspect that
the Framers would ascribe to such a wooden and categorical rule. Id. at 73.
301
Id. at 60 (holding that the Roberts test departs from historical principles because it
admits statements consisting of ex parte testimony upon a mere reliability finding).
302
This is the “logical hook” upon which the Court hangs its holding in Crawford.
Justice Scalia asserts that the word “witness” in the Confrontation Clause should be defined
as “one who bears testimony,” which in turn is used to justify the Court’s blanket exclusion
of any “testimonial evidence.” Id. at 51. This judicial sleight-of-hand takes but five
sentences and cites to no precedent. Id. at 51.
303
Id.
304
Id.
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Court significantly inflates its lexicographic choice by asserting that the
bearing of testimony is a more formalized activity than presenting other
types of evidence. 305 Resting such an important point of the analysis on one
dictionary definition is suspect, particularly when no reason for using that
particular dictionary over another is given. 306 The logic of the opinion is
dependent upon accepting that the definition of “witness” is the bearer of
“testimony,” rather than a more general (but no less plausible) definition of
“witness,” such as one who bears or presents “evidence.” Should this
definition of witnesses be accepted (rather than the more formalized “bearer
of testimony”), it would be a much more tenuous inferential leap to
establish the type of bright-line rule announced in Crawford.
Yet the fact is, one can look elsewhere in legal dictionaries from the
period and find alternative definitions of “witness.” For example, a legal
dictionary from 1811 defines a witness as “[o]ne who gives evidence in a
cause” 307 and a second from 1848 likewise defines a witness as “one who
gives evidence in a cause.” 308 The “bearer of testimony” definition, while
critical for sewing up the logic of the Court’s holding, seems to be only one
of several equally plausible options.
This is not to say that Ohio v. Roberts was wholly unproblematic. The
old reliability standard lacked a unifying theory to ground its application. It
typically provided no more protections to defendants than the Federal Rules
of Evidence envisioned.309 Under this standard, the Confrontation Clause
had a limited effect. 310 While this is potentially a problem to address, the
solution is not Crawford.
Imposing the rigid testimonial standard in Crawford to foreign
intelligence might effectively bar certain terrorism trials in federal court.
While in other contexts the costs this rigid rule creates might simply result
in fewer cases being brought, terrorism trials present a unique situation.
The Bush Administration’s experiment with military tribunals raises a
possible alternative to the acquittal/dismissal decision the government
might otherwise be faced with. It is not entirely clear how the Crawford

305

Id.
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543–44 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s approach has become ‘disconnected from history and
unnecessary to prevent abuse.’ The Court’s reliance on the word ‘testimonial’ is of little
help, of course, for that word does not appear in the text of the Clause.”) (citation omitted).
307
6 GILES JACOB & T. E. TOMLINS, THE LAW DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE,
PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE OF THE ENGLISH LAW 450 (1811).
308
J.J.S. WHARTON, ESQ., THE LAW LEXICON, OR DICTIONARY OF JURISPRUDENCE 1070
(1848).
309
Bradley, supra note 232, at 318 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
310
Friedman, supra note 31, at 554.
306
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rule would apply to such commissions, but the “flexible” evidentiary rules
of these tribunals would no doubt make them an attractive option to an
overzealous administration driven by political pressures to punish terrorists.
Nevertheless, these commissions have proven at the very least a political
liability and at most a denial of fundamental human rights. They are not a
valid option, and to the extent that Crawford incentivizes their use, it should
be overruled.
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